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A R T I C L E

Rulemaking vs. Democracy:
Judging and Nudging Public
Participation That Counts
by Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart, and Josiah Heidt

A

Cynthia R. Farina is the William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Cornell
University. Mary Newhart is the Executive Director and Senior Researcher, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative.
Josiah Heidt is the 2011-2012 E-Government Fellow, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative.

n underlying assumption of many open government
enthusiasts is that more public participation will
necessarily lead to better government policymaking: If we use technology to give people easier opportunities
to participate in public policymaking, they will use these
opportunities to participate effectively. Yet, experience thus
far with technology-enabled rulemaking (e-rulemaking)
has not confirmed this “if-then” causal link. Such causal
assumptions1 include several strands: If we give people the
opportunity to participate, they will participate. If we alert
people that government is making decisions important to
them, they will engage with that decisionmaking. If we
make relevant information available, they will use that
information meaningfully. If we build it, they will come. If
they come, we will get better government policy.
This Article considers how this flawed causal reasoning around technology has permeated efforts to increase
public participation in rulemaking. The observations and
suggestions made here flow from conceptual work and
practical experience in the Regulation Room project. Regulation Room is an ongoing research effort by the Cornell
eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), a multidisciplinary group
of researchers who partner with the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) and other federal agencies.2 At the
The full version of this Article was originally published as: Cynthia R
Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy:
Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 Mich. J.
Envtl. & Admin. L. 123 (2013). It has been excerpted and updated
with permission of Michigan Journal of Environmental and
Administrative Law, Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart, and Josiah
Heidt. Please see the full article for complete footnotes and sources.
1.	

2.	

Fallacies of this kind (sometimes referred to as “magical thinking”) refer
to nonscientific causal reasoning, and can be associated with a number of
cognitive biases (i.e., mistakes human beings make in reasoning, evaluating,
remembering, or other cognitive processes) and include attentional bias and
confirmation bias. See Behavioral Law and Economics 1-10 (Cass Sunstein ed., Cambridge University Press 2000), for an introduction to cognitive biases.
See Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ceri/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2012).
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core is an experimental online public participation platform that offers selected “live” agency rulemakings.3 The
goal is discovering how information and communication
technologies (ICTs) can be used most effectively to engender broader, better participation in rulemaking and similar
types of policymaking.4
This Article begins by explaining how the belief that
new ICTs would result in broadscale popular participation
eclipsed the question “why is more public participation in
rulemaking a good thing?” Perhaps democracies inevitably conflate more participation with better government.
However, treating the value of more participation as selfevident has left us without guidance on how to value the
new participation that technology brings, and on how to
deploy technology to get the participation we really want.
Part II analyzes the differences between how participation
is valued in electoral democracy and in rulemaking. Part
III discusses implications of these differences for designing
rulemaking participation systems.

I.

The Drive for E-Participation

Federal agencies have used emerging ICTs to increase
public participation in rulemaking. Regulations.gov has
enabled the public to view rulemaking documents online
and added governmentwide online comment submission
to the previous options of fax and e-mail, although observers have called for system improvements.5 The motivating
3.	
4.	

Reg. Room, http://www.regulationroom.org (last visited July 28, 2012).
See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social
Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 Pace L. Rev. 382
(2011) [hereinafter Rulemaking in 140 Characters]. The Planning Room
(planningroom.org) will apply the technology and techniques developed to
support public participation in rulemaking in a different complex policy
environment: updating an agency’s strategic plan.
5.	 E.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Comm. on the Status & Future of Fed. ERulemaking, Achieving the Potential: The Future of Federal ERulemaking (2008); Cary Coglianese et al., Unifying Rulemaking Information: Recommendations on the New Federal Docket Management System, 57
Admin. L. Rev. 621 (2005).
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Web 2.0 idea is not simply that users make rather than
retrieve content, but that “Web 2.0 offers all users the
same freedom to contribute.”6 Advocacy groups have used
the Internet to mount membership “calls to action” for
high profile rulemakings. Technology and participation
are no longer linked, but fused, and technology becomes
political. In this techno-political environment, participation is axiomatically good, and more participation is necessarily better.

II.

What Kind of Participation Should We
Value?

Federal e-government leaders’ conviction that Web 2.0
would enable government to tap dispersed citizen knowledge subsumed any more particularized assessment of
how, in the complex and demanding policy environment
of rulemaking, more public participation would add value.
Without such reflective assessment, technology-enabled
commenting often leads to increased participation that
only expresses opinions or preferences without elaboration
or deliberation. For example, calls to action launched by
established advocacy organizations have resulted in mass
e-mail comments that are numerous and duplicative.7
While the incidence of mass commenting is low relative
to the number of new rules proposed each year, when a
rulemaking does prompt mass commenting the impact on
the agency can be immense.8
Examining such mass e-mail campaigns, Professor Nina
Mendelson found that “agency officials appear to be discounting these [preference]-laden comments, even when
they are numerous.”9 Rulemaking is not supposed to be a
plebiscite.10 It would be troubling if the agency were making decisions based on the numerical weight of outcome
preferences.11 Mendelson takes on this conventional view
with a challenging set of questions.12 Increasingly, we rec6.	
7.	

8.	
9.	
10.
11.

12.

Web 2.0: Characteristics, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Web_2.0#Characterstics (last modified Aug. 6, 2012 at 5:55 AM) (emphasis added).
See Stuart W. Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-Mails: Perverse Incentives
and Low Quality Public Participation in the U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1
Pol’y & Internet 23, 34 fig. 4, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Case Against Mass
E-Mails].
John M. Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 Duke L.J. 988-99 (2006); The Case
Against Mass E-Mails, supra note 7, at 46.
Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1343 (2011).
See Rulemaking in 140 Characters, supra note 4, at 436-37 (describing “regulatory rationality” rulemaking requirements).
Some have expressed concern about e-rulemaking because it might push
agencies toward plebiscitary decisionmaking. See, e.g., David Schlosberg &
John S. Dryzek, Digital Democracy: Virutal or Real?, 115 Organ. & Env’t
332 (2002); Bill Funk, The Public Needs a Voice in Policy, But Is Involving the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea?, CPRBlog, Ctr. for Progressive Reform (Apr. 13, 2010), http://progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.
cfm?idBlog=F74D5F86-B44E-2CBB-ED1507624B638 09E.
Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1371-79.
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ognize that regulatory decisions are heavily preference- or
value-laden, even when they also require use of scientific or
other specialized knowledge.13 If this is so, why shouldn’t
the agency take account of citizens’ value preferences?
When choices among competing values must be made,
government should be attending to citizens’ value preferences at least until they impinge on other values protected
from majoritarian override. Even if agencies ought not
give decisive weight to numbers of mass comments, why
shouldn’t such participation count as evidence of values
citizens want favored in regulatory decisionmaking?14 This
argument challenges us to think more deeply about the
relationship of rulemaking to democratic government and
how the value of participation in each is related.

A.

All Preferences Are Not Created Equal

Citizens’ preferences about public policy outcomes may be
grounded in very different amounts and kinds of information. The following typology, while oversimplified, captures
differences in the information quality and deliberativeness
of heuristic preference formation:
1. Spontaneous Preferences: The preferences a citizen expresses when she has neither focused on the
issue, nor been targeted by efforts to persuade her
about the issue. Sometimes described as “top-of-thehead”15 or “re-active”16 —generally derived from the
individual’s general knowledge, underlying value
system, and worldview.
2. Group-Framed Preferences: Groups (like the Environmental Defense Fund or National Rifle Association)
can play a powerful role in the formation of citizens’
public policy preferences. They become important
components of an individual’s civic identity and
serve the valuable function of signaling when an issue
“deserves” attention by those who share the group’s
values.17 Mass communication campaigns rely on
group-framed preferences.
13. See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession,
and Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 733, 735-36
(2011); Stephen Zavestoski et al., Democracy and the Environment on the
Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 Sci,
Tech, & Hum. Values 383 (2006); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking
Regulatory Democracy, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 411, 461-68 (2005).
14. Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1371-79.
15. E.g., James Fishkin & Robert Luskin, Experimenting With a Demoractic
Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion, 40 Acta Politica 284, 287
(2005); John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Response: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci.
579 (1992).
16. “Reactive” is in contrast to “reflective.” E.g., Julie S. Weber et al., MultiFormat Notifications for Multi-Tasking, in Human-Computer Interaction—Interact 2009, at 247 (2009).
17. E.g., Michael A. Hogg & Scott A. Reid, Social Identity, Self-Categorization,
and the Communication of Group Norms, 16 Comm. Theory 7, 7-8, 18-21
(2006).
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3. Informed Preferences: These are preferences based on
exposure to, and consideration of, reasonably full and
accurate factual information and fairly representative
arguments for both sides of the issue.
4. Adaptive Preferences:18 These are informed preferences
modified by an assessment of the larger socio-political
environment, legal and organizational constraints,
and the claims of competing preferences. These are
choices of the workable over the ideal. Voluntary
conflict resolution processes often build consensus
through adaptive preferences.

B.

Preference Valuing in Democracy vs. Rulemaking

In electoral democracy, participation based on any of these
preferences is valued. Voters are asked for outcomes, not
reasons. Many voters are unaware of, or mistaken about,
the record and positions of candidates for major office even
on policy issues that they identify as important.19 In contrast,
rulemaking is a process in which outcome legitimacy turns
on a formally transparent process of reasoned deliberation.
Agencies are expected to produce data-driven cost and risk
analyses, to identify the facts they consider relevant and
entertain claims that these facts are wrong or incomplete,
to assess alternative approaches, to respond to questions
and criticism, and to explain why their proposed solutions
are the best choices within the bounds of what their statutory authority says they can, must, or may not consider.
Participation that counts in rulemaking requires reasongiving, and this privileges some types of preferences. Citizens must invest the time and cognitive resources required
to form preferences that enable their engagement in reasoned decisionmaking. But informed participation comes
at the cost of inclusiveness; not every interested member of
the public will have resources to process the voluminous
and legally, technically and linguistically complex information produced by a rulemaking.

C.

Are Value Preferences Different?

Mendelson posed the question, even if mass public
comments have little weight generally, why shouldn’t
these “value-focused comments”20 count when rulemaking decisions depend on value choices? We believe the
answer is that the preferences expressed in such mass
18. We use this term despite the Sen/Nussbaum critique of “adaptive preferences.” See Martha Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development 11266 (2000); Amartya Sen, Women, Technology and Sexual Division, 6 Trade
& Dev. 195 (1985). Adaptation can be a positive, as well as a negative, phenomenon. E.g., Miriam Teschl & Flavio Comim, Adaptive Preferences and
Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations, 63 Rev. Soc. Econ.
229 (2005) (arguing that the adaptive preference critique has a particular,
narrow view on adaptation).
19. See Michael X. DelliCarpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know
About Politics and Why It Matters 2663-64 (1996); Martin P. Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential
Elections of the 1980s, at 123-26 (1991); Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall
Jamieson, Issue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presidential General Election, 36 Presidential Stud. Q. 243 (2006).
20. Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1362.
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comments may suffice for electoral democracy, but not
for rulemaking, even when a rulemaking is heavily laden
with value choices.
Importantly, the contrast between the electoral democracy and rulemaking models of participation can be drawn
even within the administrative process. Agency rulewriters,
often career officials with substantive, scientific, technical,
legal or economic expertise, typically draft rulemaking
proposals, read and summarize comments, and prepare
final rules. Their work is reviewed at various levels, within
and outside of the agency, that are headed by presidential appointees who are susceptible to political oversight
and media scrutiny. Additionally, significant rules must
be cleared by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA), whose job includes ensuring that the rule
is consistent with the President’s priorities. A draft preamble that merely describes the receipt of mass public comments is enough to put politically attuned actors on notice
that the rulemaking might draw the attention of White
House staff, members of Congress, and the media.
Determining the extent to which review by these actors
shapes the rule that emerges from “the agency” is notoriously difficult.21 It is implausible that mass public comments are ignored by the agency’s political leadership and
OIRA.22 Rather, the administration may simply be pursuing a set of value preferences at odds with preferences
expressed by most of the mass commenters. For agency
political leadership, it seems appropriate for mass public comments to simply generate whatever pressure they
can on Congress, the media, or competing power centers
within the administration.
But what about at the rulewriter’s level, where reasoned
decisionmaking is supposed to happen? Professor Peter
Strauss has written of the culture of administrative legality,
whose norms impel rulewriters to justify regulatory outcomes on more than political preference.23 To the extent
rulemaking is “democratic,” we expect it to be a deliberative process, rather than an electoral one.24 Agencies are
expected to acknowledge conflicting interests and values,
thoughtfully consider solutions, and clearly explain why
some interests and values ought to have priority over others. This account of reasoned decisionmaking is an ideal
rather than a reality. Still, the value of participatory inputs
must be gauged by the process we expect the agency to
engage in. By that measure, mass public comments will
rarely deserve much value. Though the individuals submit21. See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision
Making, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1127, 1149-54 (2010).
22. Cf. William F. West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature, 65 Pub. Admin. Rev. 655, 662 (2005) (describing public comments
as “a fire alarm that alerts politicians to agency actions”); William F. West,
Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in
Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 Pub. Admin.
Rev. 66 (2004) (concluding that public comments inform political overseers of constituent views).
23. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative
Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 696 (2007).
24. “Deliberative” here signifies characteristics such as reflection, reasonably
full information, and genuine engagement with interests and values of
all stakeholders.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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ting comments through mass calls to action may genuinely
hold the expressed preferences, and though those preferences may be relevant to the rulemaking, neither genuineness nor broad relevance is sufficient to create comments of
value to the agency.
First, an agency could not assume these comments are
fairly representative of citizens’ preferences in general. Also,
given the standard brief, conclusory mass-comment text
these campaigns usually produce, the agency would not be
able to tell if an individual commenter holds informed or
adaptive preferences. Instead, the agency must assume that
the preferences: (i) are based on incomplete, perhaps erroneous, information; (ii) have not taken account of competing arguments, interests, and policy considerations; and
(iii) have not considered the workability or acceptability of
regulatory outcomes more nuanced than absolute acceptance or rejection of the values asserted.
Thus, a reasonable agency would assume that mass
comments suffer from the kinds of fundamental defects in
information and judgment that would (justifiably) prompt
judicial reversal were such flaws found in the agency’s own
decisionmaking. Why would we want government decisionmakers to attend to such flawed preferences?25 Moreover, would mass public commenters maintain the same
preferences were they to have more complete information?
The reasonable agency simply could not know.

III. Designing for Public Participation That
Counts
Unpacking the statement “Rulemaking is not a plebiscite” in this way helps us answer the question identified at the outset: “Why is more public participation a
good thing in rulemaking?” More public participation
in rulemaking is not a good thing. Rather, the goal of a
Rulemaking 2.0 system 26 should be more participation
that satisfies three conditions:
1.	 Participation by stakeholders and interested members of the public who have traditionally been undervoiced in the rulemaking process (Who)
2.	Participation that takes the form of germane “situated knowledge” and informed or adaptive preferences (What)
3.	 Participation in rulemakings in which the existence
of the first two conditions can reasonably be predicted to exist, and the value is reasonably likely to
outweigh the costs of getting the desired participation (When)

25. Cf. David Hudson & Jennifer VanHeerde-Hudson, “A Mile Wide and an
Inch Deep”: Surveys of Public Attitudes Towards Development Aid, 4 Int’l J.
Dev. Educ. & Global Learning 5 (2012) (arguing that surveys regarding
global poverty are unreliable because they fail to control for knowledgelevels and perceptions of aid effectiveness).
26. Rulemaking 2.0 is a second-generation e-rulemaking system that employs
Web 2.0 information and communication technologies.
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In this section, we explain these conditions and offer
specific design principles that follow from them. Importantly, here we focus exclusively on participation by “the
public.” Different design strategies would attend Rulemaking 2.0 systems targeting other groups such as non-affiliated experts.

A.

Recognizing the Knowledge in the People

The logic of crowdsourcing27 may be compelling, but we
believe it cannot be the guide for a Rulemaking 2.0 system. A goal to get more participation may result in many
additional comments, but there is no guarantee these comments will contain valuable information for the agency.
Instead, we would frame the goal as getting more informed
participation, particularly in the kinds of rulemakings that
need what historically silent voices can add.
Many rulemakings do not need more public participation. The topics are too specialized, technical, or narrow to
generate public interest or the affected stakeholder groups
are already participating in the conventional process.28
Still, there are rulemakings in which it is possible to identify groups of individuals or entities who will be directly
affected by the regulation but who have not historically
participated in the conventional process.
Our experience on Regulation Room reveals that in
these types of rulemakings, historically “silent” stakeholders can bring “situated knowledge” that the agency itself
may not possess. Additionally, organizations purporting
to represent these stakeholders may not sufficiently convey
the full complexity of individuals’ situated knowledge. By
situated knowledge, we mean information about impacts,
problems, enforceability, contributory causes, unintended
consequences, etc. that is known by the commenter because of
lived experience in the complex reality into which the proposed
regulation would be introduced. We discuss situated knowledge in more detail elsewhere,29 but here are conclusions
drawn from two Regulation Room rulemakings:
1. Situated knowledge can reveal and explore tensions and
complexities within what may otherwise appear a unitary set of interests.
2. Sometimes, situated knowledge identifies contributory causes that may not be within the agency’s regulatory authority but could affect the impact of new
regulatory measures.
3. Sometimes, situated knowledge reframes the regulatory
issues.
Situated knowledge is often conveyed through stories.
Stories played a central role in a Regulation Room discus27. “Crowdsourcing” is simply a method of distributed problem solving: issuing
a call to a group for solutions.
28. Our experiential base is discussion over the course of two years with DOT
and other agencies that was aimed at identifying suitable rules for Regulation Room.
29. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking the Value of
Public Participation in Rulemaking, 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1185 (2012).

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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sion of a proposed DOT regulation on requirements for the
use of electronic time management systems by commercial
motor vehicle (CMV) operators. There, drivers shared stories revealing that their opposition to the proposed rule was
rooted in concerns about the counterproductive inflexibility of such systems. Several truckers described occasions
when driving with these systems had forced them to stop
when close to home, or to pull over in an unsafe location,
because unexpected traffic or weather conditions had spent
all their legal driving time. While stories of this kind may
not often radically shift agency thinking, they can provide
relevant contextual information that could help the agency
understand more fully the impact its proposal is likely to
have “on the ground.”30

B.

Principles of Rulemaking 2.0 Design

Several principles of participation system design flow from
this conception of when more public participation might
benefit the rulemaking process. The idea is not to have a
Rulemaking 2.0 participation platform displace first generation e-rulemaking systems; rather, the focus is on when
and how additional Web 2.0 outreach and content creation
technologies should be deployed.

Principle 1. No Bread and Circuses31
A democratic government should not actively facilitate
public participation that it does not value. Agencies cannot
simply ignore mass comments; given the strong organizational interests such campaigns serve irrespective of any
rulemaking impact, mass public commenting will likely
continue. Agencies understand, however, both the participation that matters to the process in general and the
amount of effort needed to participate effectively in a particular rulemaking. For government to solicit new participants without providing adequate support, or to hold out
participation methods that are easy but have little value, is
political showmanship, not open government.
The degree of purposeful participation design called for
by the “No Bread and Circuses” principle is a counterweight
to the “all-participation-has-value” philosophy instantiated
in Web 2.0. This principle requires intentionality when
selecting participation opportunities and methods:

30. Because conventional rulemaking discourse takes a more objective form, the
personalized and narrative forms may interfere with the agency’s ability to
“hear” the knowledge conveyed. See id.
31. “Bread and circuses,” traced to Roman satirist Juvenal, refers to the strategy
of Roman officials currying favor through free food and entertainment, thus
debasing democracy by discouraging the difficult work of meaningful political involvement.

8-2014

1.A. Rulemakings for expanded public
participation efforts should be selected with
care, to identify those in which dispersed,
situated knowledge is both likely to exist
and practicable to obtain.
As long as Regulations.gov provides the opportunity for
everyone to comment on all rules, there is no legal reason why the agency cannot be selective in the rules that it
also offers through a Rulemaking 2.0 system. That said,
the actual selection of good candidates for expanded public
participation can be problematic: Agency rulewriters tend
to be over-quick to dismiss the need for more participation, while e-government leaders seem over-quick to insist
that more participation could always help. Asking the following questions can help identify rulemakings where the
enhanced participation opportunities of a Rulemaking 2.0
system are likely to add value:
1. Are there identifiable types of stakeholders that do not
customarily or effectively participate in the rulemaking
process or whose only participation is via representative
organizations? Examples of such stakeholders from
a Regulation Room rule on airline passenger rights
included airline flight crews, gate agents, and individual air travelers.
2. Are these types of stakeholders likely to have useful situated knowledge? For example, women of childbearing
age arguably represent a distinct stakeholder group
in mercury pollution rulemakings because of mercury’s impacts on fetal development. But what could
such stakeholders add by way of situated knowledge
germane to setting emission limits? By contrast, park
rangers might be able to contribute to rulemakings
on restricting vehicle access to underdeveloped areas
by particularizing benefits and harms, and improving workability of possible restrictions.
3. Is it reasonably possible to convey the information these
stakeholders need to form informed or adaptive preferences that ought to be given weight in deliberative decisionmaking? The NPRM, draft Regulatory Impact
Assessment, and other documents provide information, but their audience is lawyers, sophisticated entities, and courts. Consider the difficulty of providing
reasonably complete and balanced information about
adjusting mercury pollution limits in a form useful to
laypeople; compare this to the far simpler analogous
task in the airline passenger rights rulemaking.
Even if the selection process is imperfect, the alternative (i.e., acting as if all rules would benefit from expanded
public participation) is worse, for it heightens the risk that
Rulemaking 2.0 merely fobs citizens off with the shadow
of engagement, rather than making it possible for them to
meaningfully participate in self-government.

Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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1.B. Only participation methods likely to lead
to valuable participatory outputs should be
included in a Rulemaking 2.0 system.
Web 2.0 facilitates crowdsourcing by prominently encouraging users to vote, rate, and rank content. Voting, rating,
and ranking are frequently part of Web 2.0 participation
platforms now offered to agencies because they are loweffort and highly scalable. Rulemaking, however, is not like
rating consumer products. Participant voting, rating, and
ranking has no place in a Rulemaking 2.0 system unless
use of such participation methods is affirmatively justified by
the designer. Here are situations in which justification could
be found:
1. Effectiveness of consumer information proposals.
Although low-thought spontaneous preferences generally have no rulemaking value, there are exceptions.
For example, Congress required DOT to provide
consumers information on how tire choice could
affect automobile energy efficiency. A rulemaking
sought comment on which label designs most effectively informed consumers.32 Here, voting or ranking
seems desirable.
2. To nudge more useful forms of participation. Research
has shown that inducing people to take initial steps
in a task or process can create investment in completing it.33 Low-effort and familiar acts like voting
might be used to encourage the more effortful participation of informed commenting.34

Principle 2. Abandon the Equal Treatment Norm
The equation of government fairness and neutrality with
equal treatment is engrained in our political culture. However, adopting a single model of outreach and information
for all is the regulatory equivalent of forbidding rich and
poor alike to sleep under bridges. Agencies are understandably risk-averse about any departure from conventional
rulemaking practice that might open them to judicial
reversal. Nonetheless, a Rulemaking 2.0 system will not
significantly broaden meaningful public participation
unless both outreach and information efforts are tailored
to the needs of new potential participants.

2.A. They will not come just because you build it,
or even just because you tell them about it.
Getting new participants into rulemaking requires informing novices that rulemaking is happening, they have a right
32. Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 29542
(proposed June 22, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. §575).
33. See John W. Atkinson & David Birch, The Dynamics of Achievement-Oriented Activity, in Motivation and Achievement 271 (J.W. Atkinson & J.O.
Raynor eds., 1974).
34. Cf. B.J. Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change
What We Think and Do 34-37 (2003) (describing “tunneling” design as a
form of guided persuasion).

44 ELR 10675

to participate, and they should exercise that right. Publication in the Federal Register performs these functions for
sophisticated stakeholders, but not for traditionally undervoiced stakeholders. Getting newcomers to participate
requires deliberate outreach that (i) is targeted to where
such stakeholders or interested persons get information,
(ii) employs media that they are accustomed to, and (iii)
explains what is going on in terms that make clear why
they should care.
This kind of targeted “social marketing”35 will not be
easy for agencies steeped in the equal-treatment norm.
Admittedly, there is a fine line between targeted motivational outreach and taking sides; but it is hardly clear that
it is inappropriate to imply to the beneficiaries of proposed
regulation that their interests are likely different from those
of regulated entities, and urge them to speak up for themselves in the public comment process. We cannot be sure
that a reviewing court, also steeped in the equal-treatment
norm, would not consider targeted outreach reversible
error. It would appear difficult, however, for sophisticated
commenters to demonstrate actual harm. Moreover, it
seems perverse to fault an agency charged with regulating
for the public good for soliciting participation from those
likely to benefit from its rulemaking.

2.B. Information must be tailored to different
participant needs.
Reasonably balanced information about the problem the
agency is addressing, limits on its authority, and the relevant factual and policy arguments involved is probably
the most important condition for valuable participation.
Yet the potential participants that we most want to bring
into the process are the least likely to obtain such information from current rulemaking materials. The conventions
of the NPRM have been shaped by the analytic demands
of statute and Executive Order, risk-aversion in the face of
judicial reversal, and the nature and capacity of sophisticated stakeholders. These materials simultaneously assume
a great deal of knowledge and overwhelm the intelligent lay
reader with information.
Regulation Room uses a number of information repackaging strategies to create a series of “issue posts”
that present the important aspects of the proposed rule
in relatively manageable segments and fairly plain language. We “layer” information so participants who seek
more detail can readily access the original text, while
those who want more help can get it through a glossary
of unfamiliar terms and separate pages explaining the
regulatory background. The more fundamental problem
for agencies is the idea of creating a second text, parallel
to the NPRM, that is shorter, simpler in language, and
set up to facilitate discussion by laypeople. Would any
variance in content between the formal version and “the
people’s version” create grounds for challenge? One pos35. See Matthew Wood, Marketing Social Marketing, 2 J. Soc. Marketing 94
(2012).
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sibility for managing this risk is to include a “people’s version” in the NPRM itself, following the formal version.
Any variance should then be treated no differently than if
any other two parts of the NPRM seemed ambiguous or
inconsistent: commenters have the chance to ask and the
agency has the chance to clarify.

2.C. To enable meaningful new participation,
there may be no substitute for human
assistance.
Effective participation in rulemaking is hard. The volume
and complexity of materials, even with tailored information, makes it difficult for newcomers to articulate
informed or adaptive preferences. For situated knowledge,
participants need enough understanding of the context
and issues to recognize which aspects of their experience
are applicable, and they may require help communicating
so that relevance and value are apparent.
In parallel to the role of facilitators in offline civic
engagement settings, using a skilled moderator online can
help foster norms of deliberative discourse, aid those with
less participatory experience in contributing to the discussion, and constructively manage conflicts. Regulation
Room uses trained and supervised law students as facilitative moderators; our experiences have shown that human
moderation is essential in engaging undervoiced stakeholders and interested citizens. Currently, the level of citizen
familiarity with effective participation is too low to expect
newcomers to participate usefully without additional help.
Because committing moderators for significant time is
costly, we emphasize careful selection of rules, i.e., determining when the anticipated value from new participants
is reasonably likely to outweigh the costs. Further, we also
recommend using facilitators from outside the responsible
agency to avoid perception of the moderator as censoring,
lacking genuine commitment, or becoming defensive in
the face of criticism.36

Principle 3. Means Should Change; Ends Should Not
The design of Rulemaking 2.0 systems should be a
continuing, mindful effort to strike the balance, wellrecognized by offline democratic deliberation theorists
and practitioners, between “more” and “better”—that
is, between inclusiveness and what Robert Dahl called
“enlightened understanding.”37

36. E.g., Scott Wright, Government-Run Online Discussion Fora: Moderation,
Censorship and the Shadow of Control, 8 Brit. J. Pol. & Int’l Rel., 550,
556 (2006). A very apt analogy from existing regulatory processes is the
procedure for negotiated rulemaking.
37. Robert Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Participation, 109 Pol. Sci. Q. 23, 30 (1994); see also James S. Fishkin, When
the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation
32-64 (2009).
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3.A. Do not try to make participation easy;
try to make opportunities for meaningful
participation available to everyone.
Low-effort participation tends to be worth about as much
as it costs. Rather, the purpose of Rulemaking 2.0 systems
should be on making it possible for the broadest range of
citizens to engage meaningfully in policy decisions that
affect them. The focus on increasing opportunity, rather
than participation, reminds designers of the agency of citizens. The designer’s responsibility is to create the best environment for users of different ages, education levels, and
socio-economic circumstances to recognize, understand,
and effectively participate in rulemaking. The designer
should search for effective ways to alert, inform, educate,
motivate, and support new participants, and should reflect
on criticisms and suggestions of outsiders.

3.B. Measures of success should align with what
the system is trying to achieve.
Quantitative metrics—how many “hits,” visitors, page
views, comments, etc.—are seductive. They can give
designers useful information, and we regularly use and
report them in Regulation Room. But, if more is not the
same as better, then success can’t be defined by numbers.
The problem—to which we confess no satisfactory solution—is what metrics should be used instead. What seemingly is required is some measure of comment quality that
can compare comments from different participation methods, moderator interventions, etc. Difficulty in developing
a solution led us to question more fundamentally how to
conceptualize the value that inexperienced stakeholders
and interested citizens can be expected to bring to the process. At this point, our principal contribution is a warning: Just as system designers should not encourage forms
of participation that have no value, so success should not
be judged by metrics that do not in fact measure the value
Rulemaking 2.0 systems seek to add.

IV.

Conclusion

Here we have challenged builders of civic engagement systems to reject the assumption, common in both Web 2.0
design and open-government thinking, that more participation is better. Instead, we have argued, responsible e-participation design begins with the hard question of what
types of public participation are (and should be) valued in
the particular policymaking context.
The question is hard because the answer will often be
kinds of participation that are more informed and thoughtful, and hence more effortful and rare, than the participation
that we accept in electoral democracy and that is enabled
by popular Web 2.0 mechanisms. For this reason, those
who build and those who choose to use Rulemaking 2.0
platforms must be prepared to resist the pressure to facilitate cheap and easy participation.
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Design that supports and nudges citizens toward reasonably informed participation in complex public policymaking is undeniably difficult and resource-intensive. But
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the alternative is deceptive and irresponsible. There is no
such thing as neutral design.

